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We analyze political contests (campaigns) between two parties with opposing interests.
Parties provide costly information to voters who choose a policy. The information ﬂow
is continuous and stops when both parties quit. Parties’ actions are strategic substitutes:
increasing one party’s cost makes that party provide more and its opponent provide less in-
formation. For voters, parties’ actions are complements and hence raising the advantaged
party’s cost may be beneﬁcial. Asymmetric information adds a signaling component result-
ing in a belief-threshold at which the informed party’s decision to continue campaigning
oﬀsets other unfavorable information.
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A political party proposes a new policy, for example, a health care plan. Interest
groups favoring or opposing the plan gather information to convince voters of their respec-
tive positions. This process continues until polling data suggest that voters decisively favor
or oppose the new policy and Congress responds accordingly. Recent health care debates
and the social security debate during the Bush administration are prominent examples of
this pattern.
A key question is how asymmetric access to funds aﬀects the outcome of such cam-
paigns. For example, health care reform proponents often cite their opponents’ superior
funding as the main reason for the failure of health care reform during the Clinton adminis-
tration. Hence, the question is to what degree superior funding can determine the outcome
of a political campaign and whether asymmetric access to funds can reduce voter welfare.
We formulate a model of competitive advocacy to address this and related questions.
We assume that parties cannot distort information; rather, they trade-oﬀ the cost of
information provision and the probability of convincing the (median) voter.1 The under-
lying uncertainty is about the voter’s utility of the proposed policy. There are two states;
the voter prefers party 1’s policy in one and party 2’s policy in the other. We ﬁrst study
the symmetric information case in which neither the parties nor the voter know the state
and information is revealed gradually.
Information ﬂows continuously as long as one of the parties is willing to incur its cost.
All players observe the signal, a Brownian motion with a state-dependent drift. The game
ends when no party is willing to pay the information cost. At that point, the voter picks
his preferred policy based on his beliefs. We call this game the war of information.
The war of information has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In that equilibrium,
each party chooses a threshold and stops providing information once the voter’s belief is
less favorable than that threshold. The lower a party’s cost, the more aggressive is its
equilibrium threshold and the higher is its probability of winning. Viewed as a game
between the two parties, the war of information is a game of strategic substitutes: a more
1 In Gul and Pesendorfer (2009), we consider a variant of the war of information that allows for
information distortions.
1aggressive opponent threshold implies a less aggressive best response. Hence, a party’s
easy access to resources will stiﬂe its opponent. If the signal is very informative, the eﬀect
of asymmetric costs is small. In that case, the war of information is resolved quickly with
nearly full information revelation. If the signal is very uninformative, a party with a large
cost advantage captures nearly all the surplus.
For the voter, the parties’ thresholds are complements. Raising one party’s threshold
increases the marginal beneﬁt of raising the other’s. This complementarity implies that the
voter’s payoﬀ is highest when the campaigns are “balanced,” that is, when they feature
two parties with similar costs of providing information. If the parties have suﬃciently
asymmetric costs, the voter beneﬁts from regulation that raises the cost of the advantaged
(i.e., low-cost) party and may even beneﬁt from regulation that raises both parties’ costs
equally. Such regulation makes the advantaged party provide less and the disadvantaged
party provide more information. If costs are suﬃciently asymmetric, the latter aﬀect
dominates and increases voter welfare. We also show that, to beneﬁt the voter, regulation
must increase total campaign expenditures and hence reduce the combined payoﬀ of parties.
US political campaigns devote substantial eﬀort to fundraising while US election laws
hinder these eﬀorts by limiting the amount of money an individual donor can give. Such
regulation disproportionately aﬀects the advantaged party. Our results show that the
median voter may beneﬁt from this type of regulation.
In section 4, we consider two extensions of our model. First, to allow for the possibility
that fundraising becomes more diﬃcult as public opinion turns against a party, we assume
that information costs depend on the voter’s belief. In the second extension, parties are
impatient and discount future payoﬀs. Both extensions yield unique equilibria similar to
the equilibrium of our original game. We show that discounting magniﬁes the deterrent
eﬀect of a cost advantage. Speciﬁcally, holding all other parameters ﬁxed, a party’s payoﬀ
converges to the total surplus as its cost converges to zero.
In section 5, we incorporate asymmetric information by assuming that one party
knows the true state. Hence, the party advocating the new policy knows its merit and
provides noisy information. Communication may be noisy either because parties cannot
communicate directly with voters and rely on intermediaries or because voters require time
2to fully understand and evaluate the policy. In either case, parties cannot simply “disclose”
their information. Instead, they convey information through a costly and noisy campaign.2
For example, suppose a type 1 party advocates banning an unsafe technology that
would hurt the (median) voter while a type 0 party advocates banning a safe technology
that would beneﬁt him. The voter’s prior does not warrant a ban and therefore the party
must convince him. As before, the party provides hard information through a Brownian
motion with a type-dependent drift. However, the voter now takes the party’s private
information into account and draws the appropriate conclusions from its decision to quit
or continue. The natural inference is to interpret quitting as weakness and persistence as
strength; that is, assume that the party is more likely to continue if it knows that the
technology is unsafe. We call an equilibrium that satisﬁes this restriction a monotone
equilibrium and show that it is unique.3
In a monotone equilibrium, type 1 never quits and type 0 provides information as long
as the voter’s belief that the technology is unsafe remains above a threshold p. Once the
belief reaches p, type 0 randomizes between quitting and not quitting. The randomization
is calibrated to balance unfavorable evidence so that the voter’s belief never drops below
p. Asymmetric information therefore leads to a signaling barrier, i.e., a lower bound that
cannot be crossed as long as the party provides information. Once the party quits, its type
is revealed and the voter knows that the technology is safe.
As long as the party does not quit, the voter remains unconvinced of the technology’s
safety. An observer who ignores the signaling component might incorrectly conclude that
the voter is biased in the informed party’s favor. Unfavorable information is discounted –
oﬀset by the party’s decision not to quit – while favorable information is not.
The probability of an incorrect choice (banning a safe technology) depends on the
voter’s prior but not on the party’s cost. Changing this cost changes the signaling barrier’s
location and the expected duration of the game but not the probability of an incorrect
choice. Increasing the cost has two oﬀsetting eﬀects: ﬁrst, not quitting becomes more
2 The literature on strategic transmission of veriﬁable information (Milgrom and Roberts (1996),
Austen-Smith (1992)) has focused on the incentive to disclose a known signal. This literature assumes
that disclosure is costless.
3 There are also non-monotone equilibria. We discuss non-monotone equilibria at the end of Section 5.
3costly (hence there is less incentive to provide information). Second, not-quitting becomes
a more informative signal.
1.1 Related Literature
The war of information resembles the war of attrition. However, there are two key
diﬀerences: ﬁrst, in a war of attrition both players bear costs as long as the game continues
while in a war of information only one player incurs a cost at each moment. Second,
the resources spent during a war of information generate a payoﬀ relevant signal. If the
signal were uninformative and both players incurred costs throughout the game, the war
of information would become a war of attrition with a public randomization device. The
war of information is similar to models of contests (Rosenthal and Rubinstein (1984), Dixit
(1987), and rent-seeking games (Tullock (1980)). The key diﬀerence is that in a war of
information, the two sides generate useful information.
Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) examine strategic information transmission between
two competing lobbies and a legislator. They consider a static setup in which lobbies
may provide a single binary signal and analyze whether and when lobbies provide useful
information to the legislator. A problem in Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) and in Austen-
Smith (1994) is ensuring that the informed party has incentive to disclose the information.
In our model, this incentive problem is absent. Our model ﬁts situations in which the
informed party cannot simply disclose information but must convey it through a costly and
noisy campaign. The Austen-Smith and Wright setting is appropriate when an informed
lobby interacts with a sophisticated policy maker to whom information can be conveyed
at no cost and without noise.
The literature on strategic experimentation (Harris and Bolton (1999, 2000), Cripps,
Keller and Rady (2005)) analyzes the free rider problem that arises when agents incur costs
to learn the true state but can also learn from the behavior of others. Our information
structure is similar to that of Harris and Bolton (1999); the signal is a Brownian motion
with unknown drift.4 However, the war of information provides diﬀerent incentives: a party
would like to deter its opponent from providing information and therefore beneﬁts from
4 See also Moscarini and Smith (2001) for an analysis of the optimal level of experimentation in a
decision problem.
4a cost advantage beyond the direct cost saving. In a model of strategic experimentation,
agents have an incentive to free-ride on other players and therefore would like to encourage
opponents to provide information.
Our model is related to work on campaign advertising, most notably, Prat (2002) who
assumes that campaign expenditures are not inherently informative but may signal private
information about the candidate’s ability.5 Our asymmetric information game is a hybrid
of Prat’s model and one of informative advertising. Prat provides a diﬀerent argument
for restricting political advertising: a party caters to a privately informed campaign donor
at the voters’ expense. Prohibiting political advertising may decrease the resulting policy
bias and hence yield higher welfare. In our model, campaign spending may hurt voters
by restricting their information. Clearly, both eﬀects play a role in public policy debates
about campaign ﬁnance regulation.
Yilankaya (2002) analyzes the optimal burden of proof. He assume an informed de-
fendant, an uninformed prosecutor and an uninformed judge. This setting is similar to
our asymmetric information model. However, Yilankaya’s model is static; that is, parties
commit to a ﬁxed expenditure at the outset. Yilankaya explores the trade-oﬀ between in-
creasing the burden of proof and increasing penalties for convicted defendants. He shows
that higher penalties may lead to larger errors, i.e., a larger probability of convicting in-
nocent defendants or acquitting guilty defendants. A higher penalty his model is like a
lower cost in ours. Hence, our analysis shows that in a dynamic setting, if the defendant is
informed, increasing penalties have no eﬀect on the probability of convicting an innocent
defendant or acquitting a guilty one.
5 See also Potters, Soof and Van Winden (1997).
52. The War of Information
The War of Information is a three-person, continuous-time game. Players 1 and 2
are parties and player 3 is the voter. Nature endows one party with the correct (voter-
preferred) position. Then, both parties decide whether or not to provide information. Once
the ﬂow of information stops, the voter chooses a party (or its policy). The voter’s payoﬀ
is 1 if he chooses the party with the correct position and 0 otherwise. Party i incurs ﬂow
cost ki/2 while providing information but earns an additional payoﬀ of 1 if it is chosen.
Players are symmetrically informed.6 Let pt denote the probability that the voter
(and parties) assigns at time t to party i having the correct position and let T be the time
at which the ﬂow of information stops. It is optimal for the voter to choose party 1 if and
only if pT ≥ 1/2. We say that party 1 (2) is trailing at time t if pt < 1/2 (pt ≥ 1/2).
We assume that only the trailing party may provide information. Hence, the game
stops whenever the trailing party quits. The equilibrium below remains an equilibrium
when this assumption is relaxed and parties are allowed to provide information while they
are ahead. We discuss the more general case at the end of this section.
We say that the game is running at time t if, at no τ ≤ t, a trailing player has quit.
As long as the game is running, all three players observe the process X where
Xt = µt + Zt (2)
and Z is a Wiener process. Hence, X is a Brownian motion with uncertain drift µ and
variance 1. The realization µ = 1/2 (µ = −1/2) means that party 1 (party 2) holds the
correct position. The prior probability that party i holds the correct position is 1/2 for
i = 1,2. Let p be the logistic function; that is,
p(x) =
1
1 + e−x (3)
for all x ∈ I R. We set p(−∞) = 0 and p(∞) = 1. A straightforward application of Bayes’
law yields
pt := Pr{µ = 1/2|Xt} = p(Xt)
6 See Section 5 for the case of asymmetric information.
6and therefore, i is trailing if and only if
(−1)i−1Xt < 0 (4)
In this section, we restrict both parties to stationary, pure strategies. In Appendix
B, we show that this restriction is without loss of generality. Speciﬁcally, we show that
the war of information has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and this equilibrium is
in stationary strategies.
A stationary pure strategy for player 1 is a number y1 < 0 (y1 = −∞ is allowed)
such that player 1 quits providing information as soon as X reaches y1. That is, player
1 provides information when y1 < Xt < 0 and quits as soon as Xt = y1. Similarly, a
stationary pure strategy for player 2 is an extended real number y2 > 0 such that player 2
provides information when 0 ≤ Xt < y2 and quits as soon as Xt = y2. Let
T = inf{t > 0|Xt − yi = 0 for some i = 1,2} (5)
if {t|Xt = yi for some i = 1,2} ̸= ∅ and T = ∞ otherwise. Observe that the game runs
until time T. At time T < ∞, player 3 rules in favor of player i if and only if XT = yj for
j ̸= i. If T = ∞, we let pT = 1/2 and assume that both players win.7 Let y = (y1,y2)
and let v1(y) denote the probability that player 1 wins given the strategy proﬁle y; that
is, v1(y) = Pr{pT > 1/2}. The probability that 2 wins is v2(y) = 1 − v1(y).




1 if s < 1/2
0 otherwise
(6)









The parties’ utilities are
Ui(y) = vi(y) − ci(y) (8)
7 The speciﬁcation of payoﬀs for T = 1 has no eﬀect on the equilibrium outcome since staying in the
game forever is never a best response under any speciﬁcation. We chose this particular speciﬁcation to
simplify the notation and exposition.
7while the voter’s utility is
U3(y) = E[max{pT,1 − pT}] (9)
When the belief p(Xt) is in the range (p(y1),1/2], party 1 provides information while
[1/2,p(y2)) is the corresponding range for party 2. It is convenient to describe strategies




Hence, α1 = 1 − 2p(y1) ∈ (0,1] and α2 = 2p(y2) − 1 ∈ (0,1]. For both players, higher
values of αi indicate a greater willingness to bear the cost of information provision. If αi
is close to 0, then i is not willing to provide much information and quits at yi close to
zero. Conversely, if αi = 1, i provides information no matter how far behind he is (i.e.,
y1 = −∞ or y2 = ∞). Without risk of confusion, we write Ui(α), where α = (α1,α2)
in place of Ui(y). We let Wk denote the war of information with costs k = (k1,k2) and
strategy sets (0,1]2; that is, Wk restricts players to stationary strategies. Lemma 1 below
derives a simple expression for the players’ payoﬀs given the strategy proﬁle α.
















If αi = 1, then Ui(α) = −∞.
The win-probabilities in Lemma 1 follow from the fact that p(Xt) is a martingale and
therefore
Pr(1 wins)p(y2) + Pr(2 wins)p(y1) = 1/ 2 (10)
where the right hand side of the above equation is the prior. Substituting (1 − α1)/2 for
p(y1) and (1 + α2)/2 for p(y2) yields the desired win-probabilities.
Lemma 2 below uses Lemma 1 to establish that player i’s best response to αj is
well-deﬁned, single valued and diﬀerentiable. The lemma also shows that the war of
information is dominance solvable. In Appendix B, we use this last fact to show that the
8war of information has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even if nonstationary
strategies are permitted.
The function Bi : (0,1] → (0,1] is party 1’s best response function if
U1(B1(α2),α2) > U1(α1,α2)
for all α2 ∈ (0,1] and α1 ̸= B1(α2). Party 2’s best response function is deﬁned in an
analogous manner. Then, α1 is a Nash equilibrium strategy for party 1 if and only if it is
a ﬁxed-point of the mapping ϕ deﬁned by ϕ(α1) = B1(B2(α1)). Lemma 2 below ensures
that ϕ has a unique ﬁxed-point.
Lemma 2: There exist diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing best response functions for both
parties. Furthermore, if α1 ∈ (0,1) is a ﬁxed-point of ϕ, then 0 < ϕ′(α1) < 1.
Using Lemma 2, Proposition 1(i) below establishes that the war of information has a
unique equilibrium. Proposition 1(ii) shows that a player becomes more aggressive if his
cost decreases or his opponent’s cost increases. Player i’s equilibrium strategy converges
to 0 as his cost goes to inﬁnity and converges to 1 as it goes to zero. It follows that any
strategy proﬁle α ∈ (0,1)2 is the equilibrium for some pair of costs.
Proposition 1: (i) Wk has a unique Nash equilibrium αk. (ii) The function αk
i is strictly
decreasing in ki, strictly increasing in kj and has range (0,1)2.
Proof: Appendix A.
We have assumed that the states have equal prior probability. To model situations
with an arbitrary prior π, we can choose the initial state X0 = x so that p(x) = π. The
initial state does not aﬀect the equilibrium; that is, if (α1,α2) is the equilibrium for X0 = 0
then (α1,α2) is also an equilibrium for X0 = x.
However, the prior does aﬀect equilibrium payoﬀs and win probabilities. For example,









party 2 quits at time 0. In those cases, the prior is so lopsided that the trailing party
does not ﬁnd the campaign worthwhile. The game ends in period 0 and the voter chooses





, the win probabilities satisfy the
following version of Equation (10):
Pr(1 wins)p(y2) + Pr(2 wins)p(y1) = π
Recall that p(y1) = (1 − α1)/2 and p(y2) = (1 + α2)/2 and therefore
Pr(1 wins) =
2π − 1 + α1
α1 + α2
.
We have assumed that the drift of Xt is µ ∈ {−1/2,1/2} and its variance is 1. We
can show that these assumptions are normalizations and entail no loss of generality. Let















while the voter’s payoﬀ is unchanged. Hence, in equation (11), δki replaces the ki of
Lemma 1. After this modiﬁcation, the analysis above extends immediately to the general
µ1,µ2, and σ2 case. The parameter 1/δ measures the signal’s informativeness and therefore
increasing δ is like increasing both k1 and k2.
2.1 Both Parties Provide Information
Throughout, we have assumed that only the trailing party can provide information.
Consider a simple extension in which both parties may incur costs if they choose but the
second party’s eﬀorts generate no additional information. Then, if actions are unobserv-
able, the leading party will never provide information. It can be shown that even if players
10can observe information provision eﬀorts, the equilibrium of the war of information remains
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
A more natural alternative extension is the Moscarini and Smith (2001) formulation.
These authors assume the following signal process:
dXt = µdt + σ(nt)dZt
where nt is the number of parties that provide information at time t and σ(2) ≤ σ(1).8
Thus, the signal variance is reduced if both parties provide information. With this formu-
lation, the equilibrium of Proposition 1 remains an equilibrium. To see why, note that if a
party’s strategy is stationary, its opponent has a strict incentive not to provide information
when leading: pt is a martingale and therefore a player cannot increase the probability of
winning (at most he may change the speed of learning) by providing additional informa-
tion. Since information provision is costly, such a deviation would lower the party’s payoﬀ.
Therefore, our equilibrium is also an equilibrium with the Moscarini-Smith formulation.
However, the new game may admit other equilibria.9
3. Resources, Outcomes and Welfare
The parameters k1 and k2 quantify the eﬀort a party or a candidate must exert to
raise funds. A small ki means that the party has easy access to funds while a large ki
indicates that the party ﬁnds it diﬃcult to raise money. Proposition 1 implies that party
1’s chance of winning is decreasing in k1 and increasing in k2. Hence, the advantaged party
is more likely to win.
However, the eﬀect of superior resources is limited: let π = 1/2 and suppose that
party 1 has unlimited access to resources (i.e., k1 is arbitrarily close to zero). For any ﬁxed
k2, the probability that party 2 wins remains bounded away from zero. To see this, note
8 Moscarini and Smith (2001) use the model dXt = dt +  p
nt dZt to analyze the optimal level of
experimentation in a decision problem with unknown drift. In their case, nt represents the number of
signals the agent acquires and dXt represents the running sample mean of nt signals.
9 To see how one might construct other equilibria, assume that (2)=(1) is small so that the signal
is much more informative when both parties provide information. We conjecture that there are equilibria
in which parties “cooperate” by simultaneously providing information over some range of voter beliefs.
This behavior reduces expenditures and can be sustained with the threat of reverting to the (less eﬃcient)
equilibrium in which only the trailing party provides information.
11that B2(1) depends on k2 but not k1. Also, α2 ≥ B2(1) > 0 and α1 ≤ 1 and therefore,
party 2’s win-probability v2 satisﬁes
v2 = α2/(α1 + α2) ≥ B2(1)/(1 + B2(1)).
Next, we examine how the signal’s informativeness (i.e., δ = σ
2
(µ1−µ2)2) aﬀects the
parties’ win-probabilities and payoﬀs. The following proposition shows that if the signal
is very informative (δ → 0), then both parties’ payoﬀs converge to 1/2. In that case, all
information is revealed and both parties win with equal probability. If the signal is very
uninformative (δ → ∞), then the parties’ payoﬀs depend on the cost ratio k2/k1. Deﬁne







1 − s + s2 − 2
)
and note that h is increasing, h(0) = 0,h(1) = 1/3 and lims→∞ h(s) = 1. The following
proposition shows that party 1’s payoﬀ in an uninformative war of information is h(k2/k1)
and while party 2’s is h(k1/k2). Let Wδk be the war of information with cost k and
informativeness δ, let αδk = (αδk
1 ,αδk
2 ) be the unique Nash equilibrium of Wδk and let
Vi(δk) be player i’s payoﬀ in that equilibrium.
Proposition 2: (i) limδ→0 Vi(δk) = 1/2 and limδ→∞ Vi(δk) = h(kj/ki) for j ̸= i = 1,2.
(ii) limδ→0 V3(δk) = 1, limδ→∞ V3(δk) = 1/2 and V3(δk) is decreasing in δ.
Proof: Appendix A.
Since h(0) = 0, Proposition 2(ii) reveals that if the signal is uninformative, a party’s
win-probability converges to one as its cost goes to zero (and the opponent’s cost stays
ﬁxed). If the two parties are evenly matched, then both prefer a very informative to a
very uninformative signal; that is, if k1 = k2, limδ→0 Vi = 1/3 while limδ→∞ Vi = 1/2
for i = 1,2. An informative signal leads to a quick resolution and therefore information
expenditures are a vanishing fraction of the surplus. By contrast, a third of the surplus is
spent providing information if the signal is uninformative and k1 = k2.
12To determine campaign’s value for the voter, note that without it the voter’s payoﬀ
is 1/2. Hence the value of the campaign w is




The above expression reveals that parties’ actions are complements for the voter. If one
party does not provide information (αi = 0), then w = 0. This complementarity suggests
that the voter is best served by “balanced” campaigns; that is, campaigns in which costs
are comparable. Our next results conﬁrm this intuition.
Let δ = 1; hence, V3(k) is the voter’s equilibrium payoﬀ. Let c(k) be the sum of
the parties’ equilibrium expenditures given costs k. We say that f : (0,∞) → I R+ is a
threshold function if it satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) f(s) < s and there is z < ∞ such that f(s) = 0 if and only if s ≤ z.
(ii) f is strictly increasing for s ≥ z and unbounded;
Proposition 3: There is a threshold function f such that
(i) V3(k) is increasing in k1 at k1 < f(k2) and decreasing in k1 at k1 > f(k2).
(ii) c(k) is increasing in k1 if k1 < f(k2).
Proof: Appendix A.
Proposition 3(i) shows that when parties’ costs are suﬃciently asymmetric, regulation
that raises the advantaged party’s cost increases voter welfare. Since f(s) < s, only the
advantaged party can be below the threshold and hence raising the disadvantaged party’s
cost never beneﬁts the voter. Moreover, if the disadvantaged party has costs below z, the
threshold is zero. In that case, regulation that raises campaign costs always harms the
voter. Figure 1 below illustrates the relation between costs and voter utility.
Regulation that increases the advantaged party’s cost lowers its threshold and in-
creases the disadvantaged party’s (by Proposition 1) threshold. As a result, the disadvan-
taged party’s payoﬀ increases while the advantaged party’s payoﬀ decreases. Proposition
3(ii) implies that the sum of parties’ payoﬀs decreases as a consequence of any regulation






















In some situations, regulation cannot target the advantaged party but aﬀects both
parties. Our next result shows regulation that increases both parties’ costs equally will
beneﬁt the voter if the disadvantaged party’s cost is suﬃciently large.







at k = (k1,k2).
Proof: Appendix A.
Propositions 3(i) and 4 consider the welfare of the median voter who is indiﬀerent
between the two parties when the states are equally likely. Suppose every voter has a
threshold γ such that at pt = γ he is indiﬀerent between the parties. At pt = 1/2, voters
with thresholds below 1/2 prefer party 1 while voters with thresholds above 1/2 prefer
14party 2. If party 1 is the advantaged party, any regulation that increases the median
voter’s utility also increases the utility of all voters in the latter group. Thus, a majority
of voters beneﬁt from the regulation but voters who have a suﬃciently strong preference
for the advantaged party’s policy do not. Therefore, with a diverse population of voters,
Propositions 3(i) and 4 imply only that the majority beneﬁts from the regulation under
the stated conditions.
Together, Propositions 3 and 4 provide a rationale for political campaigns. The key
insight is that the war of information is a game of strategic substitutes between parties.
Raising the advantaged party’s cost will raise the disadvantaged party’s threshold. For the
median voter, the parties’ actions are complements and, as a result, he prefers balanced
campaigns. However, as we show in Proposition 3(ii), regulation that raises the median
voter’s utility also raises the resources spent during the campaign.
4. Extensions
So far, we have assumed that information costs are constant. If we interpret a party’s
cost as its fund-raising ability, then it seems plausible that this cost might depend on the
party’s standing in the polls. We can model this dependence by letting ki be a function of
the voter’s belief pt. In section 4.1 below, we assume these cost functions are log-linear,
compute the resulting payoﬀ functions and establish that our earlier results are robust to
this modiﬁcation.
In Section 4.2, we investigate the eﬀect of impatience. The diﬀerence between dis-
counted and undiscounted cases is signiﬁcant if one of the parties has unlimited resources
(near-zero cost). As we show below, a party with near-zero cost captures all the surplus in
the discounted case and therefore wins with near certainty. As we have shown in section
3, this is not true in the undiscounted case.
4.1 Variable Costs
In this subsection, we assume that party 1’s information cost is decreasing while party
2’s cost is increasing in pt. To get a closed form expression similar to the one in Lemma





1−pt this implies that costs are linear functions of Xt. Hence, party i incurs ﬂow-
cost (−1)ikiXt while it provides information. Then, the expenditure functions (equations
(6) and (7)) must be modiﬁed as follows:















The game is unchanged in all other respects. Lemma 3 below shows how player’s payoﬀs
change with this simple formulation of belief-dependent costs.


























If αi = 1, then Ui(α) = −∞.
The payoﬀs in Lemma 3 are similar to those in Lemma 1. The game is still domi-
nance solvable and therefore has a unique equilibrium. Finally, the comparative statics of
Proposition 1 continue to hold.
4.2 Discounting
In this subsection, we modify the war of information so that payoﬀs are discounted.
Otherwise, the game is as described in section 2. Let r > 0 be the common discount rate
and let y1 < 0 < y2 be stationary strategies for players 1 and 2 respectively. As before,
let T be the random time at which the game ends and let pt be the probability of the
high-drift state. Let C : [0,1] → [0,1] be as deﬁned in section 2 and set C1 = C and














for j ̸= i. In appendix C, we provide closed form expressions the players payoﬀs. The
following result extends Proposition 1 to the discounted war of information W k
r .
Proposition 5: W k




strictly decreasing in ki and strictly increasing in kj for j ̸= i = 1,2.
The next result describes the key diﬀerence between the discounted and the undis-
counted cases. Fix k2 and let k1 converge to zero. Then, as in the undiscounted case,
player 1’s equilibrium strategy converges to −∞, i.e., player 1 never gives up. However,
unlike the undiscounted case, player 2’s equilibrium strategy converges to zero, i.e., player
2 gives up immediately. Hence, with discounting, if a player has zero cost but his opponent
does not he is almost sure to win. In that case, in equilibrium, the campaign provides no
information and therefore has no value for the voter.
Proposition 6: Let k∗ = (0,z) for some z > 0. Then, limk→k∗ yk = (−∞,0).
To see the intuition for Proposition 6, note that yk
1 must converge to −∞ as k1
converges to zero because the marginal beneﬁt of extending the threshold is always positive
while the cost is going to zero. Since yk
1 is going to −∞, the random time at which player
2 can win is converging to ∞ (almost surely). Since player 2 discounts future payoﬀs, the
value of winning goes to zero. However, expenditure stays bounded away from zero for
any strictly positive threshold and hence quitting immediately is optimal for player 2.
175. Asymmetric Information
In this section, we analyze the war of information with asymmetric information.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that party 1 knows the state and the voter is uninformed. To
simplify the analysis, we consider a one-sided war of information in which only party 2
provides information. For the remainder of this section, we call party 1 the party and
let k = k1. Extending the analysis to include an uninformed10 party 2 is straightforward
and, since the analysis of the uninformed party would be the same as in the symmetric
information case, we omit this extension.
The party is either type 1 or type 0. Type 1 is campaigning in the voter’s interest while
type 0 is advocating a policy that is bad for the voter. As in the symmetric information
model, the party provides information at ﬂow cost k/2. Information provision stops when
the party quits or when the voter’s belief that the party holds the correct position reaches
1/2. As long as information ﬂow continues, the type i party and the voters observe the
process Xi:
Xi
t = µit + Zt
where µi = i − 1/ 2 and Z is a Wiener process. The key diﬀerence between this and the
symmetric information setting is that now “not quitting” is itself a signal. As a result, the
voter’s beliefs depend not only on the current public signal Xi
t but also on its history.
Mixed Strategies:
The analysis of asymmetric information requires that we introduce mixed strategies.
Recall that a (stationary) pure strategy for the party is a number x such that the party
quits whenever Xt reaches x. Thus, if the party chooses strategy x then it quits by time
t if x ≥ min{Xi
τ |τ ≤ t}. A mixed strategy is a cumulative distribution function (cdf), G,
on the extended reals. The value G(z) is the probability the party plays a pure strategy
x ≥ −z, that is; G(z) is the probability that the party chooses a threshold that is less
aggressive than or equal to −z. The party’s strategy is a pair of cdfs α = (G0,G1) where






10 The uninformed party would have the same information as the voter.
18be the stochastic process that keeps track of the lowest realization of Xi
t during the interval
[0,t]. Given the strategy α = (G0,G1), Gi(−Y i
t ) is the probability that type i quits by
time t as a function of the realized sample path.
Beliefs:
For a given strategy proﬁle α, the stochastic process Liα
t is type-i’s prediction11 of
the voter’s belief at time t; that is, the probability that the voter assigns to the party
being type 1. If the probability that the party quits by time t is less than one, i.e.,
G0(−Y i
t ) · G1(−Y i
t ) < 1, then, Liα
t is determined by Bayes’ Law. In that case, we have
Liα
t =
(1 − G1(−Y i
t ))f1(Xi
t − X0)π
(1 − G1(−Y i
t ))f1(Xi
t − X0)π + (1 − G0(−Y i
t ))f0(Xi
t − X0)(1 − π)
=
1 − G1(−Y i
t )
1 − G1(−Y i
t ) + (1 − G0(−Y i
t ))e−Xi
t
where fi be the normal density with mean µi and variance 1. When G0(−Y i
t )·G1(−Y i
t ) = 1
Bayes’ Law does not apply. In this case, we set
Liα
t = 1
That is, if a party deviates and does not quit after a history at which both party types
were supposed to quit with probability 1, the voter interprets this as a sign of strength
and assigns probability 1 to type 1. This notion of equilibrium incorporates a signalling
reﬁnement similar to those in Banks and Sobel (1987) and Cho and Kreps (1987). It is a
stronger requirement than necessary for our result. Our results continue to hold as long
as voters do not interpret not-quitting oﬀ the equilibrium path as evidence of type 0.12
We provide a more detailed discussion of equilibrium reﬁnements below. There we also
identify other equilibria that emerge without any restrictions on beliefs.
Payoﬀs and Equilibrium:
For a type i party, the game ends if Liα reaches 1/2 or if the party quits. The voter
chooses policy 1 in the former case and policy 0 in the latter. For any belief process L, let
11 Since the party has more information than the voter, it’s estimate of the current voter belief is correct.
12 We use the stronger requirement purely for expositional reasons.
19τ(L) = inft{Lt ≥ 1/2}. The probability that type i wins, given any L and strategy G, is
1 − G(−Yτ(L)). Hence, the ex ante winning probability is
vi(G,L) = E[1 − G(−Y i
τ(L))]
where the expectation is taken over the possible realizations of Xi.13










where τ(L) and the expectation are as deﬁned above. Note that ci
T(G,L) is increasing in
T and may have an inﬁnite limit. The party’s payoﬀ given α = (G0,G1) is Ui(Gi,Liα) =
vi(Gi,Liα) − ci(Gi,Liα). When we wish to be explicit about the initial state x = X0, we
write Ui
x instead of Ui.
Let Wk
∗ denote the game deﬁned in this section. The strategy α is a monotone
equilibrium for game W k
∗ if no type has an incentive to deviate given the beliefs Liα. That
is, Ui(Liα,Gi) ≥ Ui(Liα,G) for all G and i = 0,1.14 We refer to the equilibrium as
monotone since it builds in the restriction on out of equilibrium beliefs described above.
We discuss non-monotone equilibria below.
The voter is not a player in the game Wk
∗ ; his behavior is an exogenously speciﬁed
function of L. The following alternative formulation with a strategic voter would yield
exactly the same results: at time t, the voter speciﬁes what he will do if the party quits
during the interval (t,t + ∆]. If the party quits, this decision is implemented; otherwise,
the voter revises his decision and the game continues.15
13 Thus, we are assuming that the party wins if it never quits. This convention does not aﬀect our
results.
14 Note that deviations do not aﬀect Li.
15 If the voter observes the quit decision before choosing a policy, then equilibria in which the party
provides information beyond the belief threshold 1=2 can be sustained: the voter may infer from an
oﬀ-equilibrium path quit decision that the party is type 0 and this inference may deter the party from
quitting. Such equilibria are not robust and are ruled out by a perturbation in which information provision
stops exogenously with some small type-independent probability. Hence, our equilibria are also the robust
equilibria of the game with a strategic voter who moves after the quit decision.
20Results:
Proposition 7, below, shows that in a monotone equilibrium, type 1 never quits. Thus,
the unique equilibrium strategy of type 1 is G1 = 0. Next, we identify a class of strategies




0 if x > z
1 − ex−z if x ≤ z
Let Y iz
t = min{z,Y i
t } and note that Fz(−Y i
t ) = Fz(−Y iz
t ).
Next, we compute the beliefs Liα
t for the party strategy α = (Fz,0) and show that

















where the inequality follows from Xi
t −Y iz
t ≥ 0. The voter’s belief would be p(Xi
t) if both
types never quit. By adding z − Y iz
t to the signal, the voter incorporates the information
that the party reveals by not quitting until t. Since Xi
t − Y iz
t ≥ 0, the belief can never
drop below p(z) and hence we call p(z) the signaling barrier. To sustain this reﬂecting
barrier, type 0 quits with a probability that exactly oﬀsets any negative Xi
t-information
once the barrier is reached. If the initial belief is below the signaling barrier (i.e., π < p(z)
or equivalently X0 < z), then Fz(X0) > 0. In this case, type 0 quits with strictly positive
probability Fz(X0) at t = 0 so that L0z
0 = p(z).
Let z∗ be the unique negative solution to the equation




Proposition 7: The strategy (Fz∗,0) is the unique monotone equilibrium of Wk
∗ .
Proof: Appendix D.
21As long as L
iz∗
t > p(z∗), the above equilibrium of Wk
∗ is like the equilibrium of the war
of information W k; the current signal Xi
t determines beliefs. However, once Liz∗ reaches
p(z∗), the quit decision also aﬀects beliefs. In fact, type 0 quits at a rate that exactly
oﬀsets any negative information revealed by Xi
t. If the party has not quit and Xi
t < z∗,
the voter concludes that either he is facing type 1 or he is facing type 0 but by chance the
random quitting strategy had the party continue until time t. The probability that type 0
quits by time t is 1 − eX
i
t−z∗. Hence, when Xi
t is “very negative,” the party counters the
public information with its private information.
An observer who ignores this signaling component might incorrectly conclude that
the voter chooses the wrong position. Evidence that in a nonstrategic environment would
indicate that the party holds the incorrect position (i.e., Xi
T < 0) may nonetheless result in
the voter adopting the party’s favored position. Hence, ignoring the signaling component
creates the appearance of bias in favor of the party conducting the campaign.
When the belief depends only on Xi (as in the case of symmetric information), it is
a function of the current signal Xi
t and independent of the path (Xi
τ)τ<t. By contrast,
the belief process is path-dependent in W k
∗ . In particular, conditional on the party not
having quit, recent (positive) public information is given greater weight than past negative
information. To see this, note that for a given Xi
t, the belief is decreasing in Y i
t = infτ≤t Xi
t.
Thus, if the signaling component is ignored, the voter appears to put too much weight on
recent information.
The signaling barrier’s location depends on k but not π while the probability that
the party wins depends on π but not k. In particular, equation (**) reveals that z∗ is
increasing in k. If π < p(z∗), then type 0 quits with strictly positive probability at time 0
so that conditional on not quitting the voter’s belief jumps to p(z∗).
Type 1 wins for sure because he never quits and X1 has strictly positive drift. To
compute type 0’s win-probability, note that once the game terminates, the voter assigns





· (π Pr(type 1 wins) + (1 − π)Pr(type 0 wins))
22Since Pr(type 1 wins) = 1, we have
Pr(type 0 wins) =
π
1 − π
A higher k makes information provision more costly but also makes not-quitting a stronger
signal. These two eﬀects cancel leaving type 0’s win-probability unchanged. Thus, we have
demonstrated the following corollary:
Corollary 1: The probability that type 0 wins the game Wk
∗ is π
1−π irrespective of k.
Our analysis of W k
∗ incorporates a simple and strong restriction on oﬀ-equilibrium-
path beliefs: we require that if the party does not quit when the candidate equilibrium
strategy speciﬁes quitting, the voter should interpret this as strength and assume that he
is dealing with a type-1 party. Since µ1 > µ0, the type-1 party does indeed get a higher
payoﬀ from continuing while both types get 0 if they quit. Hence, our reﬁnement is in
the same spirit as those of Banks and Sobel (1987) and Cho and Kreps (1987).16 Our
oﬀ-equilibrium-path beliefs can be rationalized with perturbations that put inﬁnitely less
weight on type-0 not quitting than on type-1 not quitting.
The same result would obtain if we used the following weaker reﬁnement. After
every history, type 1’s deviation (to not-quitting) is deemed at least as likely as type 0’s
deviation. This reﬁnement would also identify the equilibrium in Proposition 7 as the
unique equilibrium. The reason we used the stronger requirement is expositional. The
weaker reﬁnement would necessitate a cumbersome speciﬁcation of how oﬀ equilibrium
path beliefs respond to Xi
t. Our stronger restriction facilitates the simpler exposition
above.
As in the case of symmetric information, we have restricted the party to (probability
distributions over) stationary strategies. However, it is not too diﬃcult to see that even
if we allowed non-stationary strategies the equilibrium of Proposition 7 would remain the
unique monotone equilibrium. Thus, as in the symmetric information case, the stationarity
restriction is without loss of generality.
16 Since Wk
 is an inﬁnite horizon continuous-time game, we cannot literally apply the Banks-Sobel or
Cho-Kreps reﬁnements.
23As is typical of signaling games, without any restriction on oﬀ equilibrium path beliefs,
the war of information with asymmetric information has many stationary and nonstation-
ary equilibria. For example, take any z ∈ [z∗,0] and consider the pure strategy proﬁle
α = (z,z), (i.e., both parties quit the ﬁrst time Xi
t reaches z). Now, suppose that if the
game does not end when Xi
t reaches z, the voter assumes that the party is the weak type.






t > z and ˆ Lt = 0 otherwise.17
Hence, ˆ Liα
t is derived from α whenever Bayes’ Law applies and is equal to 0 if it does not.
The strategy proﬁle α is an equilibrium if we replace Liα with ˆ Liα in the above
deﬁnition: since the voter believes that deviating by continuing to provide information
when Xi
t < z is proof of weakness, the party has no incentive to do so. In this equilibrium,
the voter’s out of equilibrium beliefs punish the party for not quitting and therefore less
information is revealed than would have been revealed if the party were uninformed.
6. Conclusion
We have analyzed political campaigns with a model in which two parties provide
information to convince a voter. A key feature of our model is that information is con-
veyed to voters through a continuous process. This feature adds tractability but also has
substantive implications.
If only one party can provide information (as in our asymmetric information model), it
would stop as soon as the voter is convinced that its policy is as good as the alternative, i.e.,
when the voter is just indiﬀerent. Because information arrives continuously, the voter can
indeed be made just indiﬀerent, and, as a result, receives no surplus: the policy that was
optimal given the prior remains optimal at the end of the campaign. To beneﬁt from the
campaign, the voter needs competition between parties. We show that the voter beneﬁts
most when parties are equally matched - providing a rationale for regulating political
campaigns.
When a party knows the state, the indirect inference from its campaign spending will
interact with the direct information it provides. If the strategic interaction between the
party and voter is ignored, the latter seems biased in favor of the party conducting the
campaign. In particular, we show that no matter how much unfavorable direct information
is revealed, the voter’s belief cannot drop below a threshold we call the signaling barrier.
17 Recall that Y i
t = mint Xi
t.
247. Appendix A
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1










1 − e2µy1(1 − 2µy1)
)
(A1)
For z1 < 0 < z2, let P(z1,z2) be the probability that Xt hits z2 before it hits z1 and
T(z1,z2) be the expected time Xt spends until it hits either z1 or z2 given X0 = 0 and





(z2 − z1)P(z1,z2) + z1
µ
(A2)
To compute c1(y |µ), let ϵ ∈ (0,y2] and assume that player 1 bears the cost until Xt ∈
{y1,ϵ}. Then, player 2 bears the cost until Xt+τ ∈ {0,y2} if Xt = ϵ; otherwise (i.e., if
Xt+τ = 0), the process repeats with player 1 again bearing the cost until Xt+τ+τ′ ∈ {y1,ϵ}
and so on. This procedure yields an upper bound for c1(y |µ). Let (k1/2)Tϵ denote that
upper bound and note that
Tϵ = T(y1,ϵ) + P(y1,ϵ)(1 − P(−ϵ,y2 − ϵ))Tϵ
Substituting for T(y1,ϵ) and P(y1,ϵ) from (A2), we get
µTϵ =
(
(ϵ − y1)(1 − e2µy1)
1 − e−2µ(ϵ−y1) + y1
)(
1 −
(1 − e2µy1)(e−2µϵ − e−2µy2)
(1 − e−2µ(ϵ−y1))(1 − e−2µy2)
)−1
and therefore










1 − e2µy1(1 − 2µy1)
)
An analogous lower bound converges to the right hand side of (A1) as ϵ → 0 from below
proving (A1).







Let v be the probability that player 1 wins. Since pT is a martingale and T < ∞,
vp(y2) + (1 − v)p(y1) = E(pT) = 1/2










A symmetric argument establishes the desired result of U2.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2












Furthermore, throughout this range, Ui(·,αj) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and
strictly concave in αi. To verify strict concavity, note that Ui is the product of a strictly











< 0. Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition characterizes the







Note that (A3) implicitly deﬁnes the best response functions Bi. Equation (A3) together
























26Note that (A5) implies ∂Ui

































Hence, since ϕ′ = dB1
dα2
dB2
dα1 , we conclude
0 < ϕ′(α1) ≤
α1(1 − α2




Note that the α1α2
(α1+α2)2 ≤ 1/2 and, hence, ϕ′(α1) < 1 if
(1 − α2
i)(2 + αi) < 2
√
2.
The left-hand side of the equation above reaches its maximum at αi < 1/2 and at such αi
is no greater than 5/2 < 2
√
2, proving that 0 < ϕ′(α1) < 1.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Part (i): By Lemma 2, Bi’s are decreasing, continuous functions. It is easy to see that
Bi(1) > 0 and lims→0 Bi(s) =
√
1
1+2ki. Hence, we can continuously extend Bi and ϕ
to the compact interval [0,1] and the extended ϕ must have a ﬁxed-point. Since Bi is
strictly decreasing, Bi(0) < 1 implies that this ﬁxed-point is not 1. Since Bi(1) > 0,
every ﬁxed-point must be in the interior of [0,1]. Let s be the inﬁmum of all ﬁxed-points.
Clearly, s itself is a ﬁxed-point and hence s ∈ (0,1). Since ϕ′(s) < 1, there exists ε > 0
such that ϕ(s′) < s′ for all s′ ∈ (s,s + ε). Let s∗ = inf{s′ ∈ (s,1)|ϕ(s′) = s′}. If
the latter set in nonempty, s∗ is well-deﬁned, a ﬁxed-point and not equal to s. Since
ϕ(s′) < s′ for all s′ ∈ (s,s∗), we must have ϕ′(s∗) ≥ 1, contradicting Lemma 2. Hence,
{s′ ∈ (s,1)|ϕ(s′) = s′} = ∅ proving that s is the unique ﬁxed-point of ϕ and hence the
unique equilibrium of the war of information.
27Part (ii): View party 1’s best response as a function of both α2 and k1. Then, the unique
equilibrium α1 satisﬁes
B1(B2(α1),k1) = α1.
With the arguments of Lemma 2, it is straightforward to show that B1(·,·) is a diﬀerentiable













dα1 . By Lemma 1, ϕ′ < 1. Taking the total derivative of (A3) (for ﬁxed
α2) establishes that ∂B1
∂k1 < 0 and hence dα1
dk1 < 0 as desired. Then, note that k1 does not
appear in (A3) for player 2. Hence, a change in k1 aﬀects α2 only through its eﬀect on α1










By symmetry, we also have dα2
dk2 < 0 and dα1
dk2 > 0.






must go to inﬁnity and therefore αi must go to 1. Since Ui ≤ 1, it follows from (A3) that
ki → ∞ implies αi goes to 0. Fix (α1,α2) and note that Bi(αj,·) is a continuous function
and hence by the above argument there is ki such that Bi(αj,ki) = αi.
7.4 Arbitrary µ1, µ2 and σ
Let Xt be a signal state-dependent drift (µ1 > µ2) and arbitrary variance σ2. We can
rescale time so that each new unit corresponds to 1/δ =
(µ1−µ2)
2
σ2 old units. The ﬂow-costs
with the new time units is ˆ ki = δki, where ki is party i’s in the old time units. Let ˆ Xi be
the signal process in the new time unit and note that the state-dependent drift is ˆ µi = δµi











A simple calculation shows that Z1 has drift 1/2 and variance 1 and Z2 has drift −1/2 and
variance 1. Since Zi is a deterministic function of ˆ Xi the equilibrium with signal ˆ Xi must
28be the same as the equilibrium with signal Zi. Hence, the game with time renormalized
corresponds to the simple war of information analyzed above.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Let αi = 1 − ϵ. Then, for δ small we have Ui ≥ 1−ϵ
2−ϵ − ϵ for i = 1,2. Since ϵ can be
chosen arbitrarily small, it follows that Ui → 1/2 as δ → 0. Equation (A3) implies that
αi → 1 which in turn implies that U3 → 1.
We suppress the superscript δk and note that αi → 0 and hence U3 → 1/2 as δ → ∞.
Let s = k2/k1 and deﬁne a = α2/α1 and z = α2































These two equations imply that z,a are bounded away from zero and inﬁnity for large δ.







Hence, the limit solution to the above equations satisﬁes
1
1 + a
(1 − 2az) = 2z
1
1 + a
(1 − 2azs) = 2azs.
Solving the two equations for a,z and substituting the solutions into (A3) yields





1 − s + s2 − 2
)





1 − s + s2 − 2s
)
.
Note that U3 is decreasing in αi’s. Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show that both αi’s

































29and an analogous equation for player 2.











































































Next, we will show that the above expression is always negative. We will verify that
the numerator is always negative; analogous calculations for that the denominator reveal
that it is always positive. Using the bound Di ≤ 2αi





















(1 − α2)2(α2 + 1)2
which is always negative.
7.6 Proof of Propositions 3 and 4















Since α2 = B2(α1), (A6) and (A7) imply dU3






































30First, we show that g is well-deﬁned: for any ﬁxed α1, the left hand side of (A8)
is negative for α2 suﬃciently close to zero and strictly positive for α2 = α1. Note that
α1
2(α1+α2), 1−α2
2, and the last term inside the square bracket are all decreasing in α2. Hence
g is well deﬁned. Note also that the left hand side of (A8) is decreasing in α1. Hence g is
increasing. Since the terms in the brackets add up to less than 2 it follows that g(α1) < α1.
Let ˆ α2 = g(1) and note that g ≤ ˆ α2 < 1. Finally, it is easy to verify that g is continuous.
Proof of Proposition 3(i): We ﬁrst show that for every α, there is a unique k such that
α is the equilibrium of W k. To see this, let B1(α1,k1) be i’s best response to α2 given
cost k1. Taking the total derivative of (A3) establishes that ∂B1
∂k1 < 0 and proves that the
mapping that associates an equilibrium αk with each k is one-to-one and hence invertible.
Let κ = (κ1,κ2) be the inverse of this mapping. It is straightforward to show that κ is
continuous and that αi > α′
i for i = 1,2 implies κi(α1,α2) < κi(α′
1,α′
2) for i = 1,2.
Let z be the k2 that solves B2(1,k2) = ˆ α2 = g(1) and verify using (A3), that z is well
deﬁned and let F(α1) := κ2(α1,g(α1)). Since k and g are continuous so is F. Moreover,
F(1) = z and limα1→0 F(α1) = ∞ since limα1→0 g(α1) = 0. Hence, F is onto. Deﬁne
f : I R → I R such that
f(k2) =
{
0 if k2 < z
κ1(F−1(k2),g(F−1(k2))) if k2 ≥ z.
Since g(α1) < α1 it follows that f(k2) < k2. If k2 → ∞, then F−1(k2) → 0 and therefore
κ1(F−1(k2),g(F−1(k2))) → ∞ as desired.
Let k = (k1,k2) and αk = (α1,α2). If k1 < f(k2), then g(α1) > α2 and therefore the
voters utility is increasing in k1; if k1 > f(k2), then g(α1) < α2 and therefore the voters
utility is decreasing in k1.
Proof of Proposition 3(ii): Let party 1 be the advantaged party. First, we show that
the disadvantaged party’s cost is increasing in k1 under the conditions stated in Propo-
sition 3(ii). We know from Proposition 3(i) that α1α2
(α1+α2) is increasing in k1. Moreover,







31must be increasing in k1.
Next, we show that c1(α1,α2) is increasing in k1. First, note that inequality (A8)
holds if α1 ≤ 3
2α2 and therefore α1 > 3
2α2 under the hypothesis of Proposition 3(ii). Using





















We must show that c1 is increasing in k1. Note that an increase in k1 implies a decrease in
α1 and an increase in α2 by Proposition 1. Hence, it is suﬃcient to show that the above
expression is increasing in α2 and decreasing in α1 for α1 > 3
2α2.










2(1 − α1)2(1 + α1)2





Since the left hand side is increasing in α2, verifying the above inequality for α1 = 3
2α2
and α1 ∈ (0,1] is suﬃcient. A straightforward calculation reveals this to be the case and
similar calculations reveal that the derivative with respect to α2 is positive for α1 ≥ 3
2α2.







































We have already shown that α2 → 0 as k2 → ∞. Substituting for
dα1/dk1
dα2/dk1, using (A6)






dα2/dk1 → 0 as α2 → 0. Since α1











k2 → ∞. To show this, since dα1













































 (α2 + α1)










Note that α2 → 0 as k2 → ∞ and hence the right hand side of the above expression goes
to zero as k2 → ∞.
8. Appendix B: Nonstationary Strategies
In this section, we show that the unique stationary equilibrium of Proposition 1 is also
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the war of information. Nonstationary Nash
equilibria may fail subgame perfection: let ˆ α2 = B2(1) and ˆ α1 = B1(ˆ α2), where Bi’s are
the stationary best response functions of section 2. Hence, ˆ α2 is party 2’s best response to
an opponent who never quits and ˆ α1 is party 1’s best response to an opponent who quits
at ˆ α2.
Deﬁne the function ai : I R → [0,1] as follows:
ai(x) = (−1)i−1(1 − 2p(x))
where p is the logistic function. Consider the following strategy proﬁle: α2 = ˆ α2 and
α1 = ˆ α1 if a2(Xτ) < ˆ α2 for all τ < t and α1 = 1 otherwise. Hence, party 2 plays the
stationary strategy ˆ α2 while party 1 plays ˆ α1 along any history that does not require party
2 to quit. But, if 2 deviates and does not quit when he is supposed to, party 1 never quits.
First, we verify that the above strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium: Player 1’s
strategy is optimal by construction. For player 2, quitting before α reaches ˆ α2 is clearly
suboptimal; not quitting at ˆ α2 is also suboptimal since such a deviation triggers α1 = 1.
This strategy proﬁle is not subgame perfect because never quitting after a player 2 deviation
is suboptimal: at any Xt such that a1(Xt) > ˆ α1, party 1 would be better oﬀ quitting.
Below, we deﬁne the dynamic war of information ˜ W k and show that the unique
equilibrium of Proposition 1 is the only strategy proﬁle in ˜ W k that survives iterative
removal of dominated continuation strategies.
33Fix any t > 0. A (time-t) continuation strategy γi speciﬁes player i’s behavior after
time t for every possible Xt realization.18 Let Γi be the set of all player i continuation
strategies. Since our proof relies on a dominance argument, we will not need to specify
formally the mapping from continuation strategies to outcomes. It is enough that every
continuation strategy proﬁle γ ∈ Γ1 × Γ2 yield a stopping time Tγ ≥ t.
Let Tx
γ be the stopping time Tγ conditional on Xt = x. We assume that (0,1] ⊂ Γi;
that is, Γi includes all (stationary) strategies αi in which player i quits whenever ai(Xτ)
reaches αi. Given any stopping time T ≥ t, deﬁne player i’s payoﬀ as in section 2:







where C1 = C, C2 = 1 − C and C is as deﬁned in equation (6). For j ̸= i = 1,2, b ∈ [0,1]




i (γj,b) = sup
γi∈ i
Vi(γ1,γ2,b)
Hence, Vi is player i’s continuation utility given the state x and strategy proﬁle γ while V ∗
i
is the highest continuation utility i can attain against strategy γj given such an x. Since
a player can always quit, V ∗
i ≥ 0.
We say that continuation strategy γi is more aggressive than continuation strategy ˆ γi
(γi ≽i ˜ γi) if given any opponent strategy, with probability 1, the game ends later with γi
than with ˆ γi. In the statements below, it is understood that j ̸= i = 1,2.
Deﬁnition: γi ≽ ˜ γi if γ = (γi,γj) and ˜ γ = (˜ γi,γj) implies Pr(Tγ ≥ T~ γ) = 1.
We do not distinguish between γi and ˜ γi if Pr(T(γi,γj) = T(~ γi,γj)) = 1 for all γj ∈ Γj
and view such γi and ˜ γi as the same strategy. Therefore, ≽i is antisymmetric; that is,
γi ≽i ˜ γi and ˜ γi ≽i γi implies γi = ˜ γi. Note that ≽i ranks all stationary strategies; that is,
αi ≽i α′
i if and only if αi ≥ α′
i for all αi,α′
i ∈ (0,1].
Lemma B: If γ = (γi,γj), ˜ γ = (˜ γi,γj) and γi ≽ ˜ γi, then vj(Tγ) ≤ vj(T~ γ).
18 Players may choose diﬀerent continuation strategies after two t-period histories with the same Xt.
34Proof: of Lemma B: Let A = {ω ∈ Ω|Tγ ≥ T~ γ}. Hence, at ω ∈ A, player j’s expen-
diture with ˜ γ is less than it is with γ. If Tγ(ω) ̸= T~ γ(ω), then player j wins at ω with ˜ γ.
Therefore, at every ω ∈ A, player j’s probability of winning is higher and expenditure is
lower with γ than it is with ˜ γ. Since Pr(A) = 1, the desired conclusion follows.
For any constant strategy α2, V ∗
1 (α2,b) is decreasing in b and is not equal to 0 if and
only if b < B1(α2). More generally, it is not optimal for player 1 to quit immediately if
V ∗
1 (γ2,a1(Xt)) > 0. Moreover, if there exists b < a1(Xt) such that V ∗
1 (γ2,b′) = 0 for all
b′ ≥ b and for every continuation strategy γ2 that player 2 might choose for the remainder
of the game, player 1 must quit immediately. To see why the latter statement is true,
let T′ ≥ t be the time at which player 1 quits, T = inf{t′ > t|Xt′ = x} for x such that
a1(x) = b and set τ = min{T,T ′}. If T′ > t, then τ > t and since the continuation utility
at τ is 0, player 1’s utility at t given Xt is −k1(τ − t)/2 ≥ 0 and hence, τ = t. The two
observations above motive the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition: The set Γ∗
1 × Γ∗
2 ⊂ Γ is dynamically rationalizable if for all γi ∈ Γ∗
i and
b ∈ [0,1], (i) V ∗
i (γj,b′) > 0 for all γj ∈ Γ∗
j and b′ < b implies γi ≽i b and (ii) V ∗
i (γj,b′) = 0
for all γj ∈ Γ∗
j and b′ > b implies b ≽i γi.
Hence, if player i knew that player j will only choose continuation strategies from Γ∗
j
for the rest of the game, then he could conclude that any continuation strategy γi that
does not satisfy (i) and (ii) above is not a best response. That is, as long as the set of
remaining continuation strategies is not dynamically rationalizable more strategies can be
removed to yield a ﬁner prediction. The proposition below establishes that this procedure
must lead to the unique stationary strategy proﬁle.
Proposition B: The unique dynamically rationalizable set of ˜ Wk is {(αk
1,αk
2)}.
Proof: Verifying that Γ∗ = {(αk
1,αk
1)} is dynamically rationalizable is straightforward.
To complete the proof, we will show that there are no other dynamically rationalizable
sets. For any dynamically rationalizable Γ∗ = Γ∗
1 × Γ∗
2, let
¯ ai = inf{b ∈ [0,1]|b ≽i γi for all γi ∈ Γ∗
i}
ai = sup{b ∈ [0,1]|γi ≽i b for all γi ∈ Γ∗
i}
35By deﬁnition ¯ ai ≥ ai. Let ¯ bi = Bi(aj) and bi = Bi(¯ aj). By Lemma B, V ∗
2 (γ1,b′) ≤
V ∗
2 (a1,b′) = 0 for all b′ > ¯ b2 and all γ1 ∈ Γ∗
1. Since Γ∗ is dynamically rationalizable, we
conclude that ¯ b2 ≽2 γ2 for all γ2 ∈ Γ∗
2 and hence ¯ b2 ≥ ¯ a2. Similarly, since V ∗
1 (γ2,b′) ≥
V ∗
1 (¯ a2,b′) > V ∗
1 (¯ a2,b1) = 0 for all b′ < b1 and all γ1 ∈ Γ∗
1, we have a1 ≥ b1. By symmetry,
we have ¯ bi ≥ ¯ ai and ai ≥ bi for i = 1,2.
Then, since B1 is nonincreasing, we have B1(B2(a1)) = B1(¯ b2) ≤ B1(¯ a2) = b1 ≤ a1.
Lemma 2 established that ϕ = B1 ◦B2 has a unique ﬁxed point αk
1. Therefore, ϕ(a1) ≤ a1
implies a1 ≥ αk
1 and by symmetry, a2 ≥ αk
2. Hence, αk
2 = B2(αk
1) ≥ B2(a1) = ¯ b2 ≥ ¯ a2 ≥ a2
and therefore, αk
2 = a2 and by symmetry αk
1 = a1. Then, αk
1 = a1 ≤ ¯ a1 ≤ ¯ b1 = B1(a2) =
B1(αk
2) = αk
1. This proves that αk
i = ¯ ai = ai for i = 1,2. Since ≽i is antisymmetric, we
have Γ∗ = {(αk
1,αk
2)} as desired.
9. Appendix C: Extensions
9.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1: let c1(y |µ) be player 1’s expenditure given
the strategy proﬁle y = (y1,y2) and the drift µ. Hence,
c1(y) =
c1(y | 1/ 2) + c1(y | −1/ 2)
2
(C1)
First, we will show that
c1(y | 1/ 2) =k1
1 − e−y2
1 − ey1−y2 (ey1(2 − y2
1) − 2(y1 + 1))
c1(y | −1/ 2) =k1
ey2 − 1
ey2 − ey1 (2ey1(1 − y1) + y2
1 − 2)
(C2)
For z1 < 0 < z2, let P(z1,z2) be the probability that a Brownian motion Xt with drift µ
and variance 1 hits z2 before z1 given that X0 = 0. Harrison (1985, p. 43) shows that
P(z1,z2) =
1 − e2µz1
1 − e−2µ(z2−z1) (C3)
For z1 < 0 < z2, let




36where Xt is a Brownian motion with drift µ and T is the random time at which Xt = z1 or
Xt = z2. Harrison (1985), Proposition 3 provides an expression for E
∫ T
0 e−λtXtdt. Taking
the limit of that expression as λ → 0 yields
C(z1,z2 | 1/ 2) =
z2(z2 − 2 − 2z1) + ez1(z2 − z1)(z1 − z2 + 2) + ez1−z2z1(z1 + 2)
1 − ez1−z2
C(z1,z2 | −1/ 2) =
z1(z1 − 2) + ez1−z2z2(−2z1 + z2 + 2) + e−z2(−z1 + z2 + 2)(z1 − z2)
1 − ez1−z2 .
To compute c1(y |µ), let ϵ ∈ (0,y2] and assume that player 1 bears the cost until
Xt ∈ {y1,ϵ}. If Xt = ϵ, then player 2 bears the cost until Xt+τ ∈ {0,y2}. If Xt+τ = 0,
then the process repeats with player 1 bearing the cost until Xt+τ+τ′ ∈ {−y1,ϵ} and so
on. Clearly, this yields an upper bound to c1(y |µ). Let Dϵ(µ) denote that upper bound
and note that
Dϵ(µ) = k1C(y1,ϵ|µ) + P(y1,ϵ)(1 − P(−ϵ,y2 − ϵ))Dϵ(µ)
Substituting for C(y1,ϵ|µ) and taking the limit as ϵ → 0 establishes that the right-hand
side of (C2) is an upper bound for the left-hand side. We can compute analogous lower
bound which converges to the right hand side of equation (C2) as ϵ < 0 converges to 0.
This establishes equation (C2).
Recall that p(yi) = 1
1+e−yi and α1 = 1 − 2p(y1),α2 = 2p(y2) − 1. Substituting these

















The win probability is the same as in Lemma 1.
9.2 Discounting
We deﬁne
a = (1/σ2)[(µ2 + 2σ2r)1/2 − µ] = ((1/2)2 + 2r)1/2 − (1/2)
b = (1/σ2)[(µ2 + 2σ2r)1/2 + µ] = ((1/2)2 + 2r)1/2 + (1/2)
Let x1 = ey1 and y2 = e−y2. Since, y1 < 0 < y2, we have xi ∈ [0,1] with a lower xi
indicating a larger (in absolute value) threshold.



















for i = 1,2, j ̸= i,j = 1,2.
Proof: To compute the expenditure, we follow the same approach as in the proof of
Lemma 1: ﬁx µ and let E[C(y)|µ] be player 1’s expenditure given µ. To compute
E[C(y |µ)], let ϵ ∈ (0,y2] and assume that player 1 bears the cost until Xt ∈ {y1,ϵ}.
If Xt = ϵ, then player 2 bears the cost until Xt+τ ∈ {0,y2}. If Xt+τ = 0, then the process
repeats with player 1 bearing the cost until Xt+τ+τ′ ∈ {y1,ϵ} and so on. Clearly, this
calculation yields an upper bound Cϵ for E[C(y)|µ]. Let τ1 be such that Xτ1 ∈ {y1,ϵ}
given the initial state 0. Let τ2 be the random time when Xt ∈ {0,y2} given the initial







e−rtdt + E[e−rτ1 |Xτ1 = ϵ]E[e−rτ2 |Xτ2 = 0]Cϵ













































38We can compute an analogous lower bound that converges to the same limit as ϵ < 0
converges to 0. Hence, the expression above is player 1’s expenditure.
Next, we compute the utility of winning. Let T be time when the game ends; that is
the time ﬁrst t such that Xt ∈ {y1,y2}. Then,
2E[e−rT |XT = y2] =E[e−rT | 1/ 2,XT = y2] + E[e−rT | −1/ 2,XT = y2]
=
e−ay2 − eby1ea(y1−y2)













This completes the proof of Lemma C.
Note that the coeﬃcients a,b are functions of r. Letting r → 0, we obtain the payoﬀs



































where αi = 1−xi
1+xi.
Proof of Proposition 5: If we rescale the original signal ˆ X and let X = δ ˆ X, then
a = (1/δ)ˆ a. Hence, we can choose δ > 0 so that the rescaled signal satisﬁes a + b = 1 and
consider the game with the rescaled signal. Since X and ˆ X provide the same information,
the game with the rescaled signal is equivalent to the original game.


















Let K = ki











1 − a + axixj + ax
2a−1
i − (1 + xj)xa
i + (1 − a)xjx2a
i
)






a(1 − a)(x1 + x2a







1 + (1 − a)x2a
1
)
Note that h1 < 0 which implies that the second order condition is satisﬁed and that
dxi/dK > 0 at any solution to the ﬁrst order condition. We conclude that the ﬁrst order
condition has a unique solution. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that xi > 0 for
all xj ∈ [0,1] and K > 0 and that xi < 1 for all xj > 0.











since h2 < 0 (which in turn follows from the fact that 0 < a < 1) and h1 < 0. Also,
ax
a−1





























   
 
 













4a2(1 − a)2(xi + x2a
i )(xj + x2a
j )(1 − xixj)2
where
f(xi,xj) = −xi(1 − a) + x
1+a
i (1 − xj) − ax2a
i + x
1+2a
i xj(1 − a) + axjx2
i
















  ≤ 1. For that,
f(xi,xj) ≤ 2a(1 − a)(xi + x2a
i )(1 − xixj)
40is suﬃcient. Establishing the inequality for xj = 0,1 is straightforward and since f is linear
in xj, the inequality holds for all xj ∈ [0,1]. This completes the proof of uniqueness. To
see part (ii), note that xi is increasing in K and hence |yi| is decreasing in ki. Moreover,
xi is decreasing in xj and hence |yi| is decreasing in |yj|.
Proof of Proposition 6: By the ﬁrst order condition, xj stays bounded away from zero
along any sequence in which Kj stays bounded away from zero. Therefore, the ﬁrst order
condition for xi implies that xi converges to zero as Ki converges to zero. This and the
ﬁrst order condition for xj ensure that xj converges to 1 as Ki converges to zero.
10. Appendix D: Asymmetric Information
For z < x < 0, let Pi
x(z) be the probability that Xi
t hits 0 before it hits z and Ti
x(z)
the expected time Xi
t spends until it hits either 0 or z. As noted in the proof of Lemma




















1 − ez (1 + kz) − k(z − x).
(D2)
Recall that z∗ is the unique negative solution to




10.1 Proof of Proposition 7
Given any real number z and two stochastic processes ˆ Y , ˆ Z such that ˆ Y0 < ˆ Z0, consider
the following optimization problem: the party incurs ﬂow cost k/2 as long as the z < ˆ Yt <
ˆ Zt. The game ends if ˆ Y hits z or if ˆ Z − ˆ Y hits 0. In the latter case, the party gets
an additional payoﬀ of 1. Let ˆ Y0 = x. Let Wx(z, ˆ Y , ˆ Z) be the payoﬀ that the type-i
41party would get in this single person game and Tx(x, ˆ Y , ˆ Z) be the expected time until the
ends. Also, let Vx(ˆ Y , ˆ Z) = supz Wx(z, ˆ Y , ˆ Z). If ˆ Z is the constant 0, we omit it and write
Wx(z, ˆ Y ), Tx(z, ˆ Y ) and Vx(ˆ Y ).
Note that Ti
x(z) = Tx(z,X0) and Π0
x(z) = Wx(z,X0). Hence, taking a derivative with
respect to z in (D2) and using (∗∗) reveals that the unique maximizer of Wx(·,X0) is z∗
and Vx(X0) = Wx(z∗,X0) > 0 for all x < z∗ while Wz(y,X0) < 0 for all y < z ≤ z∗.19
Fact: ˆ Z ≥ ˆ Z′ for all ω,t implies Wx(z, ˆ Y , ˆ Z) ≤ Wx(z, ˆ Y , ˆ Z′).
To see why the fact is true, note that given any ω, the game ends with ˆ Z′ no latter
than with ˆ Z and the party wins with ˆ Z′ if it wins with ˆ Z.
Since X0
t = Y 0
t = z implies L
0z∗
t = p(z∗) for any z < z∗, the strategy Fz∗ is op-
timal for the type 0 party if and only if quitting when L0z∗ reaches p(z∗) and never
quitting are both optimal. Since U0
x(Gz,L0z∗) = Wp(x)(p(z),L0z∗, 1/ 2) = Wx(z,X0) when-
ever z ≥ z∗, by the deﬁnition of z∗, U0
x(Gz,L0z∗) < U0
x(Gz∗,L0z∗) for all z > z∗. Hence,
to conclude the proof that Fz∗ is optimal for the type 0 party, it is enough to verify
that U0
x(0,L0z∗) = U0
x(Gz∗,L0z∗) or equivalently that Tp(z∗)(0,L
0z∗
t , 1/ 2) · k/2 = 1. Let
a(ϵ) = Tz∗+ϵ(0,L
0z∗
t , 1/ 2). It follows (D1) above that
T0
z∗(z∗ − ϵ) + (1 − P0
z∗(z∗ − ϵ)) · a(ϵ) ≥ a(ϵ) ≥ T0
z∗+ϵ(z∗) + (1 − P0
z∗+ϵ(z∗)) · a(ϵ).










z∗+ϵ(z∗). Taking limits establishes that
a(0) = 2(e−z∗ + z∗ − 1). Hence, the expected delay cost until winning, given the strategy
proﬁle α and current voter belief p(z∗), is a(0) · k/2 = 1. Therefore, the type-0 party’s
continuation utility at belief state p(z∗) is 0. Since never quitting is optimal for the type-0
party, it is also optimal for the type 1 party.
Next, we prove that (Fz∗,0) is the unique equilibrium. For any cdf G, x is a point of
increase of G if for every ϵ > 0, there exists y,y′ ∈ (x − ϵ,x + ϵ) such that G(y) < G(y′).
Let α = (G0,G1) be any equilibrium and deﬁne xi = ∞ if Gi(x) < 1 for all x and





y,Liα) for every point of increase −z of Gi and every y. Clearly, if
xi < ∞, then it is a point of increase of Gi.
19 If x  z, then any z  x, including z, amounts to same action: quitting immediately. Hence, we
call z the unique optimal strategy.
42If x1 < x0, then the ﬁrst time Xi reaches −x1, the voter’s current belief becomes 0
and stays at 0 until the probability that the type 0 party quits reaches 1. Then, the type
0 party would have been better oﬀ with the strategy z = −x1. If x0 < ∞, then, the party
wins as soon as Xi
t < −x0 which means quitting at −x0 is not optimal for party 0. It
follows that x0 = x1 = ∞. Which means that ˆ G = 0 (i.e., never quitting) is an optimal
strategy for the type 0 party and therefore it is the unique optimal strategy for the type
1 party. Hence, G1 = 0.
By deﬁnition, U0
x(Gz,L0α) = Wx(z,X0,log(1−G0(−Y 0)). Since log(1−G0(−Y 0)) <
0, the fact above ensures that U0
x(Gz,L0α) ≥ Wx(z∗,X0) = Vx(X0) > 0 for all x > z∗.
Therefore, it is not optimal for the type-0 party 0 to quit before z∗. Hence, G0(−z) = 0
for all z > z∗. Next, suppose G0(−z) > 1 − ez−z∗ for some z < z∗. We can assume,
without loss of generality that −z is a point of increase of G0. Then, choose ϵ > 0 such
that G0(−z) > 1 − ez−z∗−ϵ.
Consider any ω,t such that X0
t = Y 0
t = z. Note that the type-0 party’s continuation
utility at (ω,τ) is no less than Wz(z − ϵ,X0 − log(1 − G0(−Y 0)) since quitting as soon
as X0 reaches z − ϵ is a feasible strategy. Since log(1 − G0(−Y 0)) ≤ log(1 − G0(−z)),
the fact above implies that the type-0 party’s continuation utility at z is no less than
Wz(z − ϵ,X0,log(1 − G0(−z)) which by the same fact is no less than Wz(z − ϵ,X0,−z +
z∗ + ϵ) = Wz∗+ϵ(z∗,X0) > 0. It follows that quitting at z is not optimal for the type-0
party contradicting the fact that −z is a point of increase of G0. Hence, G0(−z) ≤ 1−ez−z∗
for all z < z∗.
Finally, suppose G0(−z) < 1 − ez−z∗ for some z < z∗. If G(−x) = G(−z) whenever
−x > −z, let y = −∞, otherwise let y = −min{−x|G0(−x) > G0(−z)}. Then, if y = z let
y∗ < y be any point of increase of G0 such that G0(y∗) < 1−ez−z∗. (The right-continuity
of G0 and the fact that y = z ensures such a z exists.) Otherwise, let y∗ = y and note
that y∗ < z. The optimality of G0 implies that Gy∗ is also optimal for party 0. Hence,
by the fact above, we have U0
z(G0,L0α) = U0
z(Gy∗,L0α) = Wz(y∗,Xi,log(1 − G(−z)) ≤
Wz(y∗,X0,−z + z∗) = Wz∗(y∗ − z + z∗,X0) < 0 contradicting the optimality of Gy∗.
Hence, G0(−z) = 1 − ez−z∗ for all z < z∗ as desired.
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